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I examine the determinants of inter-state migration of adults within western Germany, using the
German Socio-Economic Panel from 1984-2000. I highlight the prevalence and distinctive
characteristics of migrants who do not change employers. Same-employer migrants represent one
fifth of all migrants, and have higher education and pre-move wages than non-migrants. Conditional
on age, same-employer migrants are therefore more skilled than non-migrants. By contrast, although
other migrants have higher education than non-migrants, they do not have higher pre-move wages.
Furthermore, they have in their ranks disproportionate numbers of the non-employed, unemployed
and recently laid off. It therefore seems inappropriate to characterize them as more skilled than non-
migrants. The results for same-employer migrants indicate that skilled workers have a low-cost
migration avenue that has not been considered in the previous literature. I also analyze the relation
between repeat and return migration and distinguish between short and long-distance migration. I
confirm that long-distance migrants are more skilled than short-distance migrants, as predicted by
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In this paper I contribute to a literature assessing whether migrants are more skilled than non-
migrants. It is often viewed as self-evident that migration is more beneficial, or at least less
detrimental, if it increases the average skill of the population rather than decreasing it. Sending
regions or countries speak of brain drain, while some receiving countries have immigration
policies designed to select the most skilled applicants. In standard analysis, both the costs and the
benefits of migration stem from any differences in average skills between migrants and non-
migrants. If there are no important fixed factors such as land, immigration of people with a
distribution of skills similar to that of natives will affect only the scale of the receiving economy
in the long run. If the skill distributions are different, groups complementary to the immigrants
experience labor market gains, while close substitutes for the immigrants experience losses.
Unskilled immigration provides a benefit by lowering the price of unskilled services, for
example, allowing the highly skilled to specialize more in their comparative advantage. Parallel
analysis applies to emigration.
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The scale of the economy may matter, however, if there are increasing returns to scale in
production. More relevant to the issue of migrant skills, it is conceivable that returns to scale
could be particularly large in specialized high-skill sectors, where a critical mass of rare talent
may be necessary. Furthermore, even once a critical mass has been achieved, skilled workers
may provide knowledge spillovers to their skilled colleagues, or confer externalities on others in
the population.
2 If the beneficial effects of such skilled workers accrue principally to the host
economy, these considerations suggest that an economy should encourage skilled immigration
and discourage skilled emigration.
32
The skill mix of migration could also influence economic institutions. For example, it
will affect the balance between taxpayers and recipients of transfers
4, possibly causing tax and
benefit systems to be revised. The strength of labor unions could also be affected.
5
Theoretically, the quality of migrants depends not only on relative migration benefits for
the skilled and unskilled, influenced by relative inequality across regions, but also on the relation
between skill and moving costs.
6 Empirical papers have often found that migrants are more
educated than non-migrants in the source region, and earned higher wages than non-migrants
prior to moving. Examples include Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1993) for internal U.S. migration,
and Hunt (2002) for migration from eastern to western Germany. Chiquiar and Hanson (2002)
find Mexican emigrants to the United States to be more educated than Mexican non-emigrants,
despite the fact that the United States-Mexico wage gap is higher for the unskilled. They believe
their results point to lower moving costs for the more skilled, a point also argued by Chiswick
(2000). On the other hand, it is also known that the unemployed, the laid-off, and the non-
employed are more likely to emigrate than the employed. If the unemployed and laid-off are
observably or unobservably less skilled than the employed, the results overall point to migrants
having more heterogeneous skills than non-migrants.
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I replicate these results in my analysis of the determinants of migration by adults between
federal states in western Germany. However, I show that the results indicating that many
migrants are more skilled than non-migrants are strongly influenced by a group not previously
analyzed: migrants who change state of residence without changing employer. Using the German
Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-2000, I show that same-employer migrants represent one fifth of
all migrants, even though a move must be to a non-contiguous county to be defined as inter-state
migration. Same-employer migrants have higher education and higher pre-migration earnings3
than non-migrants.   By definition, these migrants were employed before moving, and are
therefore clearly more skilled than non-migrants, conditional on age. By contrast, although other
migrants have higher education than non-migrants, they do not have significantly higher pre-
move wages. Furthermore, they have in their ranks disproportionate numbers of the non-
employed, unemployed and recently laid off. It therefore seems inappropriate to characterize
them as more skilled than non-migrants.
The results for same-employer migrants indicate that skilled workers have a low-cost
migration avenue that has not been considered in the previous literature. Same-employer
migrants may significantly raise the average skills of migrants in more situations than the one
examined here, including migration between rich countries, such as the United States and
Canada, or the United States and Germany. They are likely to be less prevalent among migrants
from poor to rich countries, however, which might appear to suggest that such migrants could be
have skills similar to or worse than those in the source.
Distinguishing between return migrants and “new” migrants, as well as between short
and long-distance moves is informative in this regard. Among migrants who are not same-
employer migrants, “new” migrants moving to a non-contiguous state could arguably be
characterized as more skilled than non-migrants, conditional on age, while this characterization
seems inappropriate for return migrants and “new” migrants moving to a contiguous state.
Conditional on education, the last group of migrants is less skilled than stayers. The higher skills
of  long-distance  migrants  compared  to  short-distance  migrants  confirms  the  theoretical
prediction that migrants will be more skilled when moving costs are high. It is consistent with
Schwartz’s (1973) finding for white males, and with the finding of Hunt (2002) that commuters
are not more skilled than stayers. The result suggests that migrants from poor countries to distant4
rich countries could be skilled by source country standards. Conversely, migrants from poor
countries to neighboring rich countries and especially commuters need not be relatively skilled,
which may go some way towards explaining the Yashiv (2004) finding of low skills among
Palestinians in Israel.
Return migrants who are not same-employer migrants are a heterogeneous group of
failures and successes. Laid-off males are very likely to undertake return migration, and return
migration accounts for 40% of the positive influence of layoffs on overall migration. This is
consistent with the theory of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), that some return migrants are
marginal migrants whose experience in the destination was worse than expected.
8 On the other
hand, I find that young people with high earnings are also likely to return home. This group has
likely undertaken migration as part of a lifecycle plan to raise earnings at home and consume at
home, as postulated by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Dustmann (2001,2003).
9
Finally, I note the link between repeat and return migration. At least 32% of all migrants
in my sample have moved previously, but more than two-thirds of repeat migrants are returning
to a state in which they have previously lived.
10 I show that two-thirds of the positive effect on
migration of previous migration comes through its influence on return moves. The effect of
previous migration is often attributed to an unobserved propensity to move, and to the lower
opportunity cost of moving if the person in question has less location-specific capital to lose than
someone who has never moved. My results show the importance of possible return migration as
a variant of the latter explanation: a location with previously established capital is available.
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Theory
Chiswick (2000) contains a simple exposition of the human capital investment model of
migration, whose origins are in Sjaastad (1962). An individual computes the gross benefit to
migration, based on the wage difference in the source and the destination, and compares it with
the cost of migration, which could include both foregone earnings and direct costs, such as
transport and psychic costs. In the simplest version of the model, the return to skill is the same in
the source and destination. If direct costs are equal for all potential migrants, migrants will tend
to be those who are better paid, and therefore more skilled, since the return to migration will be
higher for such individuals, all else equal. The higher the direct cost, the more positively self-
selected the migrants will be. Hence, migrants who move a long distance will be more positively
self-selected than migrants who move a short distance.  If all moving costs are proportional to
the wage, migrants will be similar to non-migrants.
Chiswick’s model also shows simply the result developed in Borjas (1987), based on the
Roy  model,  that  relative  returns  to  skills  (inequality)  in  the  source  and  destination  are
important.
12  If the return to skill is higher in the destination, this factor alone implies a higher
return to migration for the more skilled, and hence more positively self-selected migrants: for a
given difference in mean country wages, the skilled have a larger potential wage gain from
migration. If the return to skill is lower in the destination, this will tend to offset, and possibly
even reverse, the positive self-selection of migrants.
13
In this paper I discuss the self-selection of immigrants as viewed from the source: I
consider a migrant to be positively self-selected if he or she is more skilled than non-migrants in
the source region, as measured by personal and labor market characteristics, and the wage.
Borjas (1987) shows, however, that it is possible for a destination to attract a migrant whose6
skills were below average in the source, yet are above average in the destination (“refugee
sorting”). The converse is not possible: migrants whose skills were above average in the source
will have above-average skills in the destination.
The question of same-employer migrants has not been considered previously. A firm
might request an individual to transfer, or might solicit applications for transfers in particular
occupations, or might entertain a request instigated by an individual. In these cases, a firm will
most commonly want to transfer workers with skills not available locally at the destination site,
which implies transferred workers will be skilled, particularly with regard to firm-specific skills.
Alternatively, workers may be transferred for training at another site. Firm-specific skill
facilitates intra-firm mobility, contrary to the standard inter-firm case.
Many large firms have internal job markets which allow employees to be well informed
about opportunities at other sites.  Another site may prefer an applicant already working at the
firm, as that applicant has presumably been successfully screened according to the firm’s
standards. Such transferred workers need not necessarily have scarce observable skills, but are
likely to have good unobservable skills.
Typically, firms with multiple sites are large firms, and workers at large firms are paid
more  than  observably  equivalent  workers  at  smaller  firms.  We  would  therefore  expect
transferred workers to earn more than others because of their high human capital, and possibly
also because of rents associated with large firms.
Migration with the same employer is a low cost and low risk move: information on
vacancies is easily available, the conditions of the new job are likely to be known and similar to
the old job, skills in the old job are likely to be fully rewarded in the new job and moving costs
may even be paid.7
Data
The sample from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) includes both workers
and non-workers, aged 18-65, and spans the years 1984-2000.
14 I focus on inter-state residential
moves of residents of western Germany, since east-to-west moves may have somewhat different
determinants.
15 I consider people under 25 moving with parents under sixty, and people moving
to an adjacent county across the state border or within a metropolitan area to be non-migrants
(“stayers”). Most people who change state but continue to commute daily to the same workplace
will  be  classified  as  stayers.  However,  some  may  move  their  principal  residence  while
commuting to the old workplace on a weekly basis. Although I have taken pains to identify false
moves, I have made no attempt to identify false stays: people who move long distances without
changing states.
16 People moving abroad are recorded as missing observations. The survey will
underestimate migration, since movers are generally disproportionately lost by surveys.
In each survey, respondents are asked explicitly whether they had changed job since the
beginning of the previous calendar year. If they answer yes, they are asked the nature of the
change; a possible answer is a within-firm job-change. I call same-employer migrants those
migrants who either said they did not have a job change, or said they had a within-firm change.
Many workers genuinely changing workplace may answer that they have no job change, either if
their new job is identical to the old, or if they are on a temporary training assignment.
It is likely that some number of respondents classified as same-employer migrants do not
in fact change workplace. If these people should properly be classified as stayers, they will bias
the same-employer migrant group towards the characteristics of stayers. However, the possibility
that people who move a long way for housing or spousal reasons without changing job constitute
a distinct group cannot be excluded. It is also possible that some respondents interpret the8
question about a change in job as referring to an occupation. Teachers, for example, whose
occupation is slightly overrepresented among same-employer migrants compared to stayers,
change employer when they teach in a different state, but may not consider that they have
changed jobs. If this is common, the same-employer migrants should be viewed as constituting
not only workers transferred by their firm, but also workers who can find jobs in other states so
similar to their old job that they do not consider the change to be a job change.
Model
I begin by estimating probits for the probability that a respondent i changes state of
residence r between interviews at t and t+1, P(movet,t+1), as a function of characteristics before
the move, Xirt , whether the respondent was laid off between the interviews, Laid-offirt,t+1,
whether the respondent had migrated in the previous decade,   Moveirt-, and whether the
respondent had completed an educational qualification between the interviews, Eduirt,t+1:
P(Moveirt,t+1) = Xirtβ1 + β2Laid-offirt,t+1 + β3Moveirt- + β4Eduirt,t+1 +δr + γt + εirt.
I also control for year dummies γt and state dummies δr. I report marginal effects, and t-statistics
adjusted to reflect repeated observations on individuals. I include information on the acquisition
of an educational qualification, since many people move after completing a qualification, either
to continue their education or take a job.
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I subsequently estimate multinomial logits based on this specification. I first divide
migrants into three mutually exclusive groups: same-employer migrants, return migrants (who
were not same-employer migrants), and others.  I then divide the “others” group into those who
moved to a neighboring state, and those who moved farther. This gives me four groups of9
migrants and the group of stayers as categories for the multinomial logit. I report odds ratios
(exponentiated  coefficients)  and  t-statistics  adjusted  to  reflect  repeated  observations  on
individuals.
Same-employer  migrants  had  been  working  in  year t,  were  not  laid  off  between
interviews, and with one exception did not report being unemployed (in addition to employed) in
year t.   Therefore, the coefficients on these variables for same-employment migration are
constrained to be zero (with an odds ratio of one). When the sample is split by age or sex, the
small number with an increase in education requires this coefficient too to be set to zero for
same-employer migration. Since there cannot be any return migrants in the first year, the
coefficient on the 1984 year dummy is constrained to be zero for return migration.
 Descriptive Statistics
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that the migration rate is 0.67% per year.
18  The subsequent
columns indicate that the migration rate is twice as high among those under thirty compared to
those aged 30-49 (columns 2 and 3), and more than twice as high among those laid off as those
not laid off (columns 6 and 7). Men and women have similar migration rates (columns 4 and 5).
In Table 2 I distinguish between same-employer migrants to a new state, and same-
employer return migrants, who represent 18% and 5% of moves respectively (column 1).
19 Other
return migrants represent 17% of migrants, 31% of migrants moved to a “new” neighboring
state, and 29% moved to a “new” non-contiguous state. A majority of same-employer moves are
for people aged 30-49, for whom they represent in total 31% of moves (column 3), consistent
with  the  notion  that  these  are  transferred  workers  who  have  accumulated  firm-specific10
knowledge. Most of these moves are made by men, for whom they represent 32% of moves,
rather than women, for whom they represent only 15% of moves (columns 4 and 5).
Table 3 shows the means of the main variables of interest by migrant status, again
distinguishing between the two types of same-employer move. The most striking statistic of the
table is the share of migrants who had completed tertiary education (university or technical
higher education - Fachhochschule). While only 9% of stayers had completed tertiary education
(column 1), 28% of movers had done so (column 2), while 34% of same-employer movers to a
new state and 49% of return same-employer movers (columns 6 and 7) had done so. Same-
employer migrants are slightly older than other migrants, and with long-distance movers have the
highest pre-move wages (25-28 German marks (DM) per hour, compared to 20 for stayers).
Individuals laid off between interviews are overrepresented among movers, particularly among
return movers (column 5), where they represent 10% of the group. I shall assume that they were
laid off before moving. 32% of migrants (column 2) compared to only 3% of non-migrants
(column 1) had moved in the previous ten years, but among non-return migrants, this share is
never higher than 15%. A calculation not shown indicates that more than two-thirds of previous
movers are return movers. Means of other variables used in the regressions are shown in the
Appendix Table.
The  two  groups  of  same-employer  migrants  have  similar  characteristics,  and  in
multinomial logit analysis the hypothesis that their coefficients were the same could not be
rejected. I therefore pool these two groups in the multinomial results reported below.
As expected, same-employer migrants work disproportionately in large firms: 42% work
in firms of over 2000 employees, compared to 27% of working stayers, and 17-24% for workers
in other migrant groups. The most common and most over-represented occupation for female11
same-employer migrants is “accountants, cashiers and related”, who are 16% of same-employer
migrants compared to 9% in the general female workforce. For male same-employer migrants
the most common and most over-represented occupation is “architects and engineers”, who are
18% of the same-employer migrants compared to 4% in the general male workforce.
Results
Probits
The columns of Table 4 represent a series of probits for the probability of migration, with
some variations in the definition of migration. All specifications include controls for sex, marital
status, the presence of a child eleven or younger, the interaction of marital status and child with
sex, and dummies for foreign nationality, age, year and state, in addition to those shown in the
table. The first five columns use the migration definition described in the data section. In column
1 I add education dummies to the basic set of controls.  The omitted category is apprenticeship,
the most common category. The dummy for the unskilled “general education” category has an
insignificant negative coefficient. However, individuals with vocational training, which typically
follows an apprenticeship, or civil service training, are a significant 0.15% more likely to
migrate, while those with tertiary education are 1.2% (1.2 percentage points) more likely to
migrate, compared to a mean of only 0.7%. These results suggest that migrants are more skilled
than non-migrants. Those that acquired an educational qualification in the current year were
0.28% more likely to migrate.
In column 2, rather than using education as a proxy for skill, I use the wage in the initial
year. This is naturally only valid for those who are working. For the employed, the wage may be
the best measure of skills, since it should reflect both observed characteristics and unobserved
characteristics such as motivation or firm-specific human capital. Those who are not working are12
0.28% more likely to move than those who are working, while amongst those who are working,
those with a higher wage are more likely to migrate, indicating that the more skilled workers
migrate.   The mean hourly wage in the sample, as well as the mean wage of those with
apprenticeship education, is DM20 (standard deviation 23), while for tertiary graduates it is
DM31. The coefficient of 0.0166 indicates that were the hourly wage to rise by 31-20=11 DM
per hour, the probability of migration would rise by 0.18%, only 15% of the magnitude of the
university effect in column 1.
In column 3 I use labor force status only as a proxy for skill (although the labor force
coefficients do not prove very sensitive to the presence of other skill covariates). Similarly to
column 2, those not working are 0.27% more likely to migrate than the employed.   Those
registered as unemployed at the time of the initial interview are 0.16% more likely to migrate
than others who were not working, meaning they are 0.27+0.16=0.43% more likely to move than
the employed, about half the mean migration rate. Those laid off between interviews (who would
typically have been employed at the time of the initial interview), are 0.51% more likely to
emigrate, about half the size of the university effect.
In column 4 I include education, labor force status and wage, as well as an indicator for
working part-time (whose coefficient is insignificant). The main change when the skill indicators
are entered simultaneously is that the coefficient on the wage falls to two-thirds of its column 2
level.   In column 5 I add the covariate indicating whether the individual had moved in the
previous ten years. This is very significant: a previous move raises the probability of a
subsequent move by 2.4%, the largest effect identified. The only other coefficient to change
appreciably when this covariate is added is the coefficient on university, which falls to two thirds13
of its column 4 level: part of the reason that the university-educated are more likely to move is
that they are more likely to have moved in the past.
In columns 6-7 I recode the moves of same-employer migrants to be stays, to assess the
influence of this group on the results. I present results from the specifications corresponding to
columns 2 and 5.  Removing the same-employer migrants in column 6 causes the coefficient on
the wage to fall to 40% of its previous size (in column 2), and increases the standard error. The
coefficient is thus not close to significant. If the wage is used as a summary measure of the skill
of employed potential migrants, therefore, migrants who are not same-employer migrants are not
positively self-selected.
In column 7 I repeat the specification with all covariates including previous move.  The
coefficient on the wage is here 28% of its column 5 counterpart and insignificant, and the
coefficient on university falls to almost half its column 5 level. The coefficient on vocational
training also falls, while the coefficients on not working and being laid off rise (since migrants
who by definition were employed and not laid off have been removed). This reinforces the
impression that migrants who are not same-employer migrants are not more skilled than non-
migrants. The coefficient on a previous move falls somewhat in column 7 compared to column 5,
suggesting that some of its effect comes from identifying people likely to be mobile same-
employer movers.
In column 8, compared to the standard migration definition, I recode moves of those
returning to a state they have lived in the previous decade (who are not same-employer return
movers), to be stays. I present the specification corresponding to column 5. The coefficient
which changes the most when returners are recoded is that on a previous move: it falls to an
effect of 0.72%, only 30% as large as the column 5 effect.  Thus, most of the effect of a previous14
move works through the fact that previous movers are at risk to return home.  Nevertheless, the
remaining effect is still quantitatively important, and with university education the strongest
predictor of migration.
20 There is also a large decrease in the coefficient on a layoff: it falls from
0.45% in column 5 to 0.24% in column 8, indicating that layoffs have a strong influence on
return migration. The coefficient on not working falls when returns are coded as stays.
Multinomial Logits
In Table 5 I present the results of the multinomial equivalents of columns 2 and 5 in
Table 4. The reference category is non-migration. In columns 1-4 I focus on the wage as a
summary of skill. As expected based on the results of the probits, same-employer migrants have
significantly higher pre-move wages than stayers: the coefficient indicates that a one DM
increase in the hourly wage would increase the relative migration probability by 0.5%, and hence
a DM11 increase would increase the migration probability by 5.5%. Long-distance migrants are
similarly  positively  and  statistically  significantly  self-selected.  Return  migrants  have  an
imprecisely estimated coefficient of zero, while migrants to a neighboring state appear to have
lower wages than stayers, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Compared to the
employed, the non-employed have approximately double the relative probability of each type of
migration.
In columns 5-8 I include all the skill measures. All migrants are positively self-selected
on their education: having tertiary education approximately quadruples the probability of being
in one of the migrant categories compared to being a non-migrant (the coefficients are not
significantly different across columns). The wage coefficients generally remain unchanged, but
the coefficient for short-distance moves falls sufficiently to become significantly negative:15
conditional on education, the employed members of this group are negatively self-selected
(column 5). This is the wage effect least dwarfed by the education effect: a DM1 rise in the wage
reduces the relative probability of this type of migration by 3%, and a DM11 rise reduces the
probability by 33%.
The weak effects of wages relative to education could indicate that the importance of
education goes beyond its relation with labor market productivity. An alternative explanation,
particularly for short-distant migration for which the wage is significantly negative conditional
on education, is that some people migrate because they are underpaid in their current job. This in
turn could be a manifestation of Borjas’s “refugee sorting”.
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As expected based on the probits, the magnitude of the layoff effect is greatest for the
return migration category. The relative probability of return migration is multiplied by five for a
person who is laid off (column 7), compared to a multiple of two for a short-distance move
(column 5), and a multiple of three for a long-distance move (column 6). The effects are
significantly different at the 10% level for return and short-distance migration.
Compared to other non-employed, the unemployed are significantly more likely to make
a move to a neighboring state only. The total effect of being unemployed is the product of the
odds ratios for non-employment and unemployment: compared to the employed, the unemployed
are four times (2.22 x 1.76, column 5) more likely to move to a neighboring state than to stay,
which is larger than the layoff effect of 2.19, though insignificantly so. The effect of a layoff and
the total effect of unemployment are similar for long-distance moves (odds ratios of 3.7 and 3.1,
column 6), but the layoff odds ratio is larger for return moves (5.0 vs 3.8 in column 7), though
insignificantly so. It is possible that when workers who have the possibility of returning home
are laid off, they return immediately without waiting to register for unemployment benefits.16
Those who remain non-employed long enough to be picked up as such by the survey may have
made their decision not to return.
Lest the distinctive characteristics of the same-employer migrants be influenced by the
unmodelled fact that a respondent must be working for this migration to be an option, I have
rerun the regression of columns 5-8 on a sample of people working in the initial year. The
(unreported) coefficients on the common coefficients are similar, except that the new layoff
coefficients are larger, particularly for return migration.
 Table 6 presents the multinomial  logit specification of Table 5 columns 5-8 with the
sample split by sex. For women, only same-employer migrants have relatively higher wages than
stayers (column 8), whereas for men both long-distance movers and same-employer movers have
higher wages than stayers (columns 2 and 4). These results suggest the possibility that women
moving long distances who are not moving with the same employer are often tied movers.
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While for men the effect of a university education is strongest for same-employer moves
(column 4, odds ratio of 5.89), for women the same-employer odds ratio of 2.4 is the smallest of
the moving categories (column 8). The differences between the university coefficients across
categories are not statistically significant for men or women, however.
Also of great interest in Table 6 is the result for men that those laid off are 11.5 times
more likely than others to return home relative to staying (column 3).   This coefficient is
significantly larger than for the other migration categories. The result suggests that men who
migrate and fail return home. No such pattern is seen for women, for whom the layoff effect
operates exclusively through long-distance moves.
In Table 7 I present the same specifications for a sample split by age. I focus on young
people (18-29) and prime-aged people (30-49). Coefficients vary by age for layoffs and the17
wage. Layoffs push the young to return home (column 3 indicates that a layoff increases the
relative probability of such a move by five times), while for other moves layoffs have an
insignificant effect. Conversely, layoffs have an insignificant effect on return moves for the
prime-aged (column 7), but large significant effects of 3.5-6 on other moves (columns 5 and 6).
The association between same-employer moves and the wage does not differ much by age, but
while long-distance migrants are positively self-selected on the wage among the prime-aged, it is
rather return movers who are positively self-selected in the case of the young.
The stronger effect of layoffs on older people for non-return moves confirms the result of
Hunt (2002) for east-to-west migration. However, for east-to-west migration, younger migrants
were found to be more positively self-selected than older migrants based on the wage, which is
not the case here. The wage may be a less good skill proxy for the young, who are in an
investment phase, than for the old.
Conclusion
Skilled migrants have a low-cost avenue for migration that has not previously been
considered: transferring within their firm. This should contribute to the positive self-selection of
migrants, particularly for internal migration, or migration between rich countries. I show that this
avenue is quantitatively important for German internal migration, where a fifth of inter-state
migrants move with the same employer. If the wage is used as a summary of skill, these migrants
account for the overall positive characteristics of migrants compared to non-migrants.
Migrants who are not same-employer migrants cannot be considered generally more
skilled than non-migrants. However, it is important to distinguish further between return and
“new” migrants, and short and long-distance migrants. Return migrants are a heterogeneous18
group of failures and successes, in keeping with theory predicting that some return migrants had
worse realized outcomes of their initial migration than they had expected, while some had
always intended to return. Among “new” migrants, long-distance migrants are positively self-
selected, while short-distance migrants are not. This confirms the theory predicting that higher
moving costs increase the positive self-selection of migrants. The result suggests that migrants
from poor countries to distant rich countries are likely to be positively self-selected, while
migrants from poor countries to neighboring rich countries need not be.
Finally, I show that repeat migration is primarily accounted for by return migration. The
strong  predictive  power  of  a  previous  move  has  often  been  interpreted  as  reflecting  an
unobserved propensity to move, or identifying people with low investment in their current
location. My result indicates the importance of having a potential destination where previous
investments have been made.19
Data Appendix
I use information about the interview dates and the dates that jobs started to establish
whether a respondent had changed job between interviews. I use information on the reason a job
ended to assess whether the change had been involuntary (which I term a layoff).
I construct a variable indicating whether the respondent has moved in the previous ten
years (or since their entry to the survey, if less than ten years previously), and for migrants, I
check whether they have lived in their destination state in the previous ten years (or since entry
to the survey).  These variables will be underestimated in the early part of the survey, meaning
early return migrants will be misclassified, and the effect of a previous move will be biased
downward. I compute these variables based on the periods in which I observe respondents in the
sample, to avoid having missing values for those who temporarily left the sample.
 I construct an hourly wage rate from monthly labor earnings divided by 4.33 times usual
weekly hours. Dropping observations with missing wages reduces the sample considerably, but
does not change the overall migration rate. I do not drop observations with missing layoff
information, since this leads to a disproportionate loss of migrants, but instead include a dummy
for having missing layoff information.
The small state of Saarland is not identified separately in the GSOEP, and is treated as
part of Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate). Detailed geographic information in restricted
form is available by agreement with the SOEP Group at the DIW-Berlin.20
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Endnotes
                                                   
1 See Borjas (1999a) for more on these arguments.
2 See Kremer (1993), for example.
3 Stark (2002) shows conditions under which the possibility of emigration stimulates investment
in skill enough to raise skill per capita in the sending country.
4 Borjas and Trejo (1991).
5 Roemer (2001).
6 Borjas (1987, 1999), Chiswick (2000).
7 See also Goss and  Schoening (1984), Gregg,  Machin and Manning (1997), Hughes and
McCormick (1981). Goss and Schoening (1984) find that annual earnings have an insignificant
effect on U.S. internal migration.
8 Constant and Massey (2002, 2003) and Constant and Zimmermann (2003) find that employed
foreigners in Germany are much less likely to return to their home country than their non-
employed fellow foreigners.
9 Constant and Massey (2002, 2003), who do not split their sample by age, find that foreigners’
earnings in Germany play no role in their decision to return home. Massey and Espinosa (1997)
examine return migration in a non-random sample of Mexicans in the United States.
10 Kennan and Walker (2003) make a similar observation based on the NLSY.
11 DaVanzo (1978) and Goss and  Schoening (1984) are among previous papers to have found a
large effect of a prior move on the probability of migration. Constant and Zimmermann (2003)
and Massey and Espinosa (1997) study the probability of repeated round-trips between two
countries. DaVanzo (1983) distinguishes return and onward migration in a sample where all have
moved once.
12 See also Borjas (1999b).
13 This framework is likely to explain the negative self-selection of American male applicants for
permanent migration to English-speaking Canada found by Aydemir (2003a,b).
14 See the Data Appendix and SOEP Group (2001) for details on the data. Foreigners are over-
sampled, which reduces unweighted average education.
15 East-to-west migration is examined in Burda and Hunt (2001) and Hunt (2002).
16 Ham et al. (2003) measure migration ideally, by measuring who moves beyond a radius of a
certain distance, and show that this influences the results compared to simply using state borders.
17 Since most moves in a period where an educational qualification was obtained are likely to
take place after it is obtained, I control for educational qualifications in t+1 rather than t to avoid
characterizing migrating graduates as having lower education than is in fact the case.
18 The weighted rate is 0.80%.
19 The weighted proportions are 16% and 7% respectively.
20 In results not shown, if same-employer return movers are also coded as stayers, the coefficient
on a previous move falls to 0.0034, with a t-statistic of 5.2. If all same-employer movers and
returns are coded as stayers, the coefficient falls to 0.0022 with a t-statistic of 5.9.
21 Hunt (2002) finds a similarly weak effect of the wage compared to education for east-to-west
migration.
22 Interactions of the wage with sex, spouse, and sex times spouse all had insignificant
coefficients, however. It is difficult to estimate the multinomial logit on single women only,
since the number of moves per category becomes small.Table 1: Frequency of Year-to-Year Inter-State Migration




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample size 114,946 33,238 56,862 57,239 57,707 107,139 2,526
% migrated 0.67% 1.25% 0.58% 04.66% 0.68% 0.60% 1.43%
Notes: Unweighted means for individuals aged 18-65, unless otherwise specified. “Laid off”
means that in the second year of the pair the individual reported having been laid off since the
first interview. The sample includes some individuals whose layoff status is unknown.Table 2: Types of Year-to-Year Inter-State Migration
All 18-29 30-49 Men Women Not laid
off
Laid off






























































































Notes: Parentheses contain unweighted share for individuals aged 18-65, unless otherwise
specified. “Laid off” means that in the second year of the pair the individual reported having
been laid off since the first interview. The sample includes some individuals whose layoff status













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)















University 0.09 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.34 0.49
Not working 0.35 0.38 0.51 0.47 0.50 0 0



















0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 0 0
Previous move 0.03 0.32 0.15 0.11 1 0.15 1
Observations 114,178 768 240 219 134 162 35
Notes. Whether the individual was working or registered as unemployed, and the wage of the
employed refer to the initial year of the pair. Education is measured in the second year of the
pair, while “laid off” refers to those reporting a layoff between the two interviews. The standard

























































































































2 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.12
Notes: Marginal effects from probits on a sample of 114,946 observations. The t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted to account for repeated observations on the same person, and are
computed for the untransformed coefficients. Regressions also include sex, spouse, sex*spouse,
child, sex*child, foreign and age dummies, year dummies and state dummies. Columns 3,7 and 8
also contain a dummy for missing layoff information. The omitted education is apprenticeship.
In columns 6 and 7 same-employer migrants are coded as stayers rather than migrants. In column
8 return migrants (who are not same-employer migrants), are coded as stayers rather than
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Notes: Odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) for multinomial logits on a sample of 114,946
observations. The reference category is non-migration. The t-statistics in parentheses are
adjusted to account for repeated observations on the same person, and are computed for the
untransformed coefficients. Regressions also include sex, spouse, sex*spouse, child, sex*child,
foreign  and  age  dummies,  year  dummies  and  state  dummies.  The  omitted  education  is
apprenticeship. Columns 5-8 also contain a dummy for missing layoff information and the



















































































































Notes: Odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) for multinomial logits on a sample of 114,946
observations. The reference category is non-migration. The t-statistics in parentheses are
adjusted to account for repeated observations on the same person, and are computed for the
untransformed coefficients. Regressions also include spouse, child, foreign and age dummies,
year dummies and state dummies (Hamburg and Bremen are grouped with Niedersachsen), a
dummy for missing layoff information and two additional education dummies. The omitted
education is apprenticeship.Table 7: Multinomial Estimation of Determinants of Migration by Age
















































































































Notes: Odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) for multinomial logits on a sample of 114,946
observations. The reference category is non-migration. The t-statistics in parentheses are
adjusted to account for repeated observations on the same person, and are computed for the
untransformed coefficients. Regressions also include sex, spouse, sex*spouse, child, sex*child,
foreign and age dummies, year dummies and state dummies (Hamburg and Bremen are grouped
with Niedersachsen), a dummy for missing layoff information, and two additional education













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spouse 0.66 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.43
Sex (female)
* spouse
0.34 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.09
Child age 0-11
in household
0.31 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.29
Sex (female) *
child age 0-11
0.16 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.04 0.03
Foreign 0.26 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.09
Age 18-21 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.03
Age 22-25 0.10 0.20 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.03
Age 26-29 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.26
Age 30-39 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.14 0.19 0.23
Age 40-49 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.34
Age 50-59 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
Age 60-65 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
General
schooling
0.33 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.15 0.06
University 0.09 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.34 0.49
Apprenticeship 0.39 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.26
Vocational , civil
service training
0.19 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.20
Education
increase
0.02 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.08 0
Work part-time 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09
Laid off 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 0 0
Missing layoff
information















Notes: Unweighted means of 114,178 stayers and 768 migrants. Variables refer to the initial year
of the pair, except education, which refers to the second year. “Laid off” refers to those reporting
a layoff between the two interviews. The standard deviation of wages interacted with working is
reported in parentheses. Means of other variables are shown in Table 2. Wages are in 1991 DM.